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he agenda for the upcoming World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) negotiations on agricultural trade
is taking shape. Countries have begun to formulate
their overall approach to the round, and to deﬁne
their own expectations. Many have tabled papers
in the WTO General Council outlining their posi-
tions.1 One country, Canada, has gone farther down
the road, and issued a more speciﬁc statement of
aims and approaches.2 In addition, over 40 papers
have been prepared in the context of the “Analysis
and Information Exchange” process authorized at
the Singapore WTO Ministerial and conducted
informally by the Committee on Agriculture.3 In
other words, countries are ready to start the agri-
cultural talks as soon as they get the green light
from Seattle. This does not mean that the talks will
be easy. However well-prepared the negotiators are,
the prospect of stalemate or of minimal progress
cannot be ruled out. This paper discusses both the
substantive agenda for the talks and the frictions
that are emerging as countries take their stands. It
is too early to predict the outcome of the discussions,
but some idea of the timetable can be inferred from
the political calendar.
The next “round” of agricultural talks will be
different in many respects from the Uruguay Round
or its predecessors. In some ways the task of the
negotiators will be more clear-cut, in large part
because of the transparency introduced by the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA).
Tariff levels are easier to negotiate than non-tariff
barriers, and the deﬁned commitments on export
subsidies and domestic support can be subject to
further cuts without revisiting the deﬁnitions. But
clear-cut tasks can also focus opposition. There are
several countries that would prefer not to pursue
the path toward a more open trade system for agri-
culture, or at least not be pushed in that direction by
international pressure. Moreover, as always, nego-
tiations will take place in the context of contemporary
events. These events could overshadow and even
derail the talks. The agenda already has been inﬂu-
enced by a number of issues that were not on the
table during the Uruguay Round. There is no reason
to believe that the agenda will stop shifting with
the formal start of talks at the end of this year.
The URAA marked a turning point in agricultural
trade policy. Prior to the URAA, national policies
were largely unchecked by trade rules. Non-tariff
barriers were the norm, implying a lack of trans-
parency in trade and little incentive for the devel-
opment of competitive exports. Export subsidies
made it difﬁcult for competitive exporters to develop
markets. Domestic subsidies tilted the playing ﬁeld
in favor of less-efﬁcient producers at home and
limited the scale of specialization. The URAA 
established new rules that radically improved the
agri-food trade system. Non-tariff barriers were
replaced by bound tariffs. Export subsidies have
been limited both in the expenditure and the quan-
tity which can beneﬁt from subsidies. Domestic
support is now categorized as to whether it is mini-
mally distorting (green box), linked to production
controls (blue box) or output-increasing (amber
box), and this last is subject to agreed limits.
The next step, already mandated in the Agree-
ment (Article 20), is to hold further negotiations 
to continue the reform and market liberalization
process (WTO, 1995). It is widely accepted that 
the Agreement on Agriculture did little to liberalize
trade in agricultural products and improve market
access. Tariffs on agricultural goods are still on
average about three times as high as on manufac-
tured goods and continue to distort trade.4 The
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process of “tarifﬁcation” has produced a number of
tariffs bound at such high levels that it is difﬁcult to
see how they could be reduced by conventional
tariff-reduction techniques. Where tariff rate quotas
(TRQs) were negotiated to pry open these markets
a little, the prospect of quota rents has led govern-
ments to agree to a network of bilateral deals, and
ﬁrms to become concerned with market shares.
This has, in turn, exacerbated the problem of com-
petition between state trading enterprises and the
private trade. Export subsidies still exist, and are in
effect legitimized to the extent of their incorporation
in country schedules. The domestic farm policies of
the major industrial countries have been required to
make only relatively minor changes to bring them
into conformity with the Agreement.
In addition to the Agreement on Agriculture,
countries negotiated in the Uruguay Round an
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards
(SPS Agreement), which was aimed at the misuse
of regulations guarding animal, plant, and human
health for purposes of protecting the incomes of
local producers. By requiring scientiﬁc justiﬁcation
for standards higher than those agreed by interna-
tional bodies, the SPS Agreement has had the effect
of encouraging countries to re-examine their prac-
tices in this area. But even in this area there are
issues that remain to be clariﬁed before trade can
ﬂow unhampered by questionable health barriers.
Though there is no requirement to negotiate
changes in the SPS Agreement, some countries have
indicated that they wish to see modiﬁcations.
The overall objective of the next round of agri-
cultural talks clearly will be to continue the progress
made at the Uruguay Round. This implies negotia-
tions on improved market access, further constraints
on export subsidies and, if exporters get their way,
some tightening of the rules for domestic support.
But if this is the core agenda, there are a number of
other issues that have emerged as a result of the
experience with the Uruguay Round Agreement
that can be thought of as “extensions” of the URAA
core agenda, such as the administration of TRQs
and the issues of state trading and of export restric-
tions. As if this was not enough, several other items
are clamoring for a place on the agenda. This paper
attempts to identify some of these other “new” issues
and relate them to the core items of the agenda.
Some of these issues will be dealt with in parallel
to the agricultural talks, though not necessarily by
the same committee, and will be part of whatever
package emerges. These parallel topics include the
sensitive questions of health and food safety along
with a number of environmental issues relating to
agriculture and biotechnology. Also important to
agriculture are the issues of regional trade agree-
ments and preferential trade arrangements.
In addition, agriculture could be impacted by
talks in seemingly unrelated areas if they prove to
be a part of the negotiations. These include the
review of intellectual property rules, as well as those
on competition and investment. As always, there
are a number of political factors that will condition
the pace of the talks, including the changing power
relationship between the Parliament and the Com-
mission in the European Union; the lack of “fast
track” trade negotiating authority in the United
States; the imminent accession of China to the
WTO; and the newly emerging determination of
developing countries to be full partners in the
WTO. One should also not forget the impact of the
state of commodity markets, which can have a
marked effect on the progress of agricultural talks
as it impinges on the perceptions and policies of
individual countries. Each of these could have a sig-
niﬁcant bearing on the agricultural talks, and are
mentioned brieﬂy below.
THE CORE AGRICULTURAL AGENDA
The new round of agricultural negotiations 
will in all probability be launched at the Seattle
Ministerial. As a key part of the so-called “built-in
agenda,” the commitment to begin talks before 
the end of 1999 has already been taken. Whether
or not these agricultural talks are part of a major
round has yet to be decided. Though this may
inﬂuence the speed and scope of the talks, the
“core” agricultural agenda is largely set. This core
agenda will follow closely in the steps of the URAA.
The triad of “market access,” “export competition,”
and “domestic support” seems to have proved a
convenient set of labels for deﬁning current obliga-
tions, and all papers relating to the agricultural
agenda use this categorization of issues.
Expanding Market Access
The market access negotiations will be at the
heart of the next agricultural round. The talks will
not be a success unless a substantial step is taken
to reduce the high levels of agricultural tariffs. With
varying degrees of enthusiasm, countries have en-
dorsed this objective. The United States has calledfor an “ambitious” target for expansion of market
access:  The European Union admits that its export
interests would be served by an opening of markets,
but cautions that the process will take time.5 For the
Cairns Group, the negotiations “must result in deep
cuts to all tariffs, tariff peaks and tariff escalation.”6
Of the major players, Japan is naturally the most ret-
icent, contributing the observation that current tariff
levels “reﬂect particular domestic situations” and
that these circumstances should be given due con-
sideration in the negotiations.7 Developing countries
tend to stress the importance of expanding market
access in the products of export interest to them-
selves.8 In one case, a developing country argues
that trade liberalization may be inappropriate for
countries with foreign exchange shortages.9
From the viewpoint of improvements in the
trade system, the major market access question for
the next round is how can one initiate a process that
would lead to a removal of the discrepancy between
the level of protection in agriculture and that in the
manufacturing sector in a reasonable time period?
How does one get from tariffs of 100-200 or even
300 percent to the levels of 5-15 percent found in
most other areas of trade? This looks to be a tall
order:  It implies a continued period of signiﬁcant
tariff cuts extending well into the next millennium.
The techniques of negotiating tariff reductions
are well-established.10 One can chose between
across-the-board tariff cuts or formulae that cut
tariff peaks. One can focus on individual sectors
(zero-for-zero arrangements) or agree on compre-
hensive coverage. One can use the “request and
offer” method for identifying demands for market
access, multilateralizing the results. One can attempt
to reduce effective protection by making sure that
processed-good tariffs come down at the same rate
or faster than those of raw materials. It is unlikely
that the ministers meeting in Seattle can agree on
the modalities, though one would expect them to
specify the broad parameters.
The methods of market access discussed above
each have some merit but might not be adequate in
themselves. This suggests that negotiators might
try a “cocktail” of the various modalities.11 Imagine
agricultural tariffs divided into ﬁve categories. Low
tariffs, those less than 5 percent, could be reduced to
zero, as neither the level of protection nor the rev-
enue collected are likely to be signiﬁcant. Such
nuisance tariffs could be removed with advantage,
in agriculture as well as in other areas. Moderate
tariffs, of 5-40 percent, could be reduced by a further
36 percent cut, as in the Uruguay Round, or by the
same percentage as other tariffs if part of a more
general negotiation. The tariffs above 40 percent
are probably too high to yield to the same techniques
as industrial tariffs:  A combination of tariff cuts
and TRQ increases may be needed. Thus, for tariffs
between 40 and 100 percent, the 36 percent cut
could be augmented by an expansion of TRQs. For
the tariffs above 100 percent, some variant of the
Swiss formula may be needed along with expansion
of TRQs. And for those tariffs that are above 300
percent, it may make more sense to conduct partic-
ular “request and offer” negotiations with principle
(potential) suppliers.
In addition to the task of tariff level reduction,
two other aspects of tariff rules will probably be
discussed. One is the common phenomenon of
bound rates of tariff that are considerably higher
than the applied rates.12 There have been sugges-
tions that these gaps be reduced, for instance by
binding the applied rates. But this causes understand-
able problems for the countries involved, who will
argue that the applied rates have not been negotiated
in the WTO and therefore to bind these rates would
be unfair to those who have undertaken unilateral
liberalization. On the other hand, for those countries
with such gaps, reducing the bound rate toward the
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third country markets.”
6 See the Cairns Group “Vision” statement transmitted to the WTO as
WT/L/263, and the subsequent communiqué from the Buenos Aires
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8 See for instance, the paper by the Dominican Republic and Honduras
(WT/GC/W/119).
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“it may be appropriate to grow their own food, as far as possible, even
if it is more costly than the food stuff available in some other coun-
tries.” This can either be seen as a sophisticated argument based on
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10For a discussion of tariff reduction options, see Josling and Rae (1999).
11See Josling and Rae (1999) for an elaboration of this technique.
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applied rate is a way of getting “credit” for actions
already taken.
The other aspect of tariff policy is the form of
the tariff. The URAA mandated a tariff-only regime,
but allowed some countries to concoct complex tariffs
that involve reference prices and compound rates.13
Moreover, the Blair House agreement between the
United States and the European Union obliged the
European Union to impose a maximum duty-paid
price for cereals that acts very much like the variable
levies that were outlawed in the agreement. Many
countries also would like to insist on the use of ad
valorem tariffs rather than speciﬁc duties, which
have a somewhat more protective impact when
prices are low. The United States is calling for a
simpliﬁcation of complex tariffs:  Whether any
country will take aim at de facto variable levies 
and speciﬁc tariffs is not so clear.
One direct way to tackle the problem of the
high levels of tariffs resulting from tarifﬁcation is
to expand the guaranteed market access that forms
a part of the provisions of the Agreement on Agri-
culture.14 Some position papers (though not that
of the United States) mention the importance of
expanding TRQs in the next round. The Cairns
Group paper says that “trade volumes under tariff
rate quotas must be increased substantially.” Other
countries suggest further improvements in the
TRQ system, in addition to the administration of
the quotas (discussed in a subsequent section).
Canada argues for the elimination of the within-
quota tariff whenever the above quota tariff is
prohibitive (presumably to ensure that the quotas
are ﬁlled, rather than merely increasing quota
rents at the expense of government revenue). The
same paper suggests the introduction of a TRQ
whenever tariffs are higher than a speciﬁed level,
and increasing the product speciﬁcity of TRQs.
A possible outcome of the negotiations might
be to continue the process of expanding minimum
access as a proportion of consumption. An increase
in TRQs, say, of 1 percent of the level of domestic
consumption in each year over a ﬁve-year period
would remove much of their restrictive effect. In
most markets the quotas would become non-bind-
ing before the ﬁve-year period was over. In effect,
tarifﬁcation would have taken place at the level of
the reduced tariff applicable to the TRQ. The main
political objection to this could be that the “within-
quota” tariffs were generally left to the discretion
of the importing country to ﬁx at levels that they
judged would attract the guaranteed access quantity.
This implies that some form of re-negotiation might
have to take place on the level of these tariffs.15
Among the other market access issues, the
Special Safeguard (SSG) system is also in need of
some patching and more uniformity. The United
States would like to see use of the SSGs further
limited.16 But trade safeguards are generally consid-
ered by importing governments to be a necessary
concomitant to trade liberalization and market
access. The European Union has indicated that it
would like to see a “renewal” of the SSG in the next
agreement.  Japan makes the point even more
strongly, that “the current agreement acknowledges
that the Special Safeguard can be maintained as
long as the reform process continues.”17
One simple way to avoid the misuse of the
Special Safeguard Provisions is to seek agreement
on the level of trigger prices. Trigger prices could,
for instance, be identical (or equivalent) to the exter-
nal prices used by the governments concerned in
calculating initial tariff equivalents in the UR.
Governments had a tendency to use the lowest 
feasible external prices for calculating tariff equiva-
lents in their Uruguay Round schedules. Hence,
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(International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium, 1997).
14The TRQ system is a major concern for the health of the agricultural
trade system. A total of 1,366 tariff rate quotas were notiﬁed to the
WTO Secretariat under the reporting requirements of the Uruguay
Round. Such arrangements are particularly common in the markets
for fruits and vegetables (350), meat products (249), cereals (215),
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the quotas. The simple average quota “ﬁll” for the years 1995 and 1996
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eralization of trade.
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17An additional issue that is likely to arise with respect to agricultural
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Safeguard Provisions by developed countries to try to maintain pro-
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using the same prices as trigger prices for the Safe-
guard Provisions would make sure that additional
duties are not used too often, and are not set too
high. It will also be important to phase out the use
of the Special Safeguard Provisions after the second
period of transition. This could be done by gradually
adjusting the percentages in both the quantity trigger
provision and the price trigger provision year by
year so that the safeguards are less and less likely
to cut in.
Curbing Export Subsidies
If the high level of protection sets agriculture
apart, the widespread use of export subsidies is
perhaps the most disruptive element in the opera-
tion of world markets. The practice of subsidizing
exports of agricultural products has been con-
strained by the Uruguay Round, but most of the
subsidies are allowed to continue in a reduced
form. Countries that import agricultural products
have been the gainers in economic terms from the
subsidies, but even among these countries the dis-
turbance of the domestic market has often caused
problems. In the next round of negotiations, it will
be more difﬁcult than ever to persuade countries
that export agricultural goods with little or no sub-
sidy to allow countries, such as the European Union
and the United States, to continue their market-dis-
torting practices.
A further push to rein in these subsidies is high
on the agenda of the Cairns Group, apparently sup-
ported by the United States. The Cairns Group paper
declares that “there is no justiﬁcation for maintain-
ing export subsidies.” The United States says that
members “should agree to pursue an outcome that
will result in an elimination of all remaining export
subsidies.” Canada adds that export subsidies in
agriculture should be eliminated “as quickly as
possible.” Developing countries also are generally
in favor of the elimination of export subsidies.18
Only the European Union would have great difﬁ-
culty in agreeing to the dismantlement of export
subsidies, though it will come under considerable
pressure to do so.19
The simplest way to continue the process of
reducing the incidence of export subsidies would
be to extend the schedule of reductions agreed to
in the Uruguay Round. As with the market access
improvement, this could be done using the same
base. This would imply constraining the expendi-
ture on such subsidies by another 36 percent, thus
removing 72 percent of the subsidy expenditure
that was used in the base period. Continuing
the quantity restriction would imply that 40 per-
cent of the volume of subsidized exports would
have been removed from the market over the two
periods of reform. But since the remaining 60 per-
cent would have to be subsidized with only 29 per-
cent of the expenditure, the disruption that could
be caused by such subsidies would be signiﬁcantly
reduced.
The continuation of the process of reduction
would be constructive, but elimination of export
subsidies altogether would clearly have signiﬁcant
advantages. But the prerequisites for dispensing
with export subsidies are a renewed conﬁdence in
world markets, with ﬁrmer and more stable price
levels for the major products, and reduced depen-
dence on intervention buying in domestic policies.
The former condition itself depends on the success
of the agreement in increasing trade and reducing
protection:  Removing export subsidies may be the
only way to create the conditions under which they
are not needed. As for domestic programs, it is pos-
sible that practice and sentiment in the European
Union may have moved further away from the use
of market support policies to other instruments by
the end of the negotiations. If these conditions were
met, then a new set of negotiations could, say, set a
target to phase out export subsidies over a seven-
year period.
Besides the question of export subsidies, sev-
eral problems remain in the area of export com-
petition. In the Uruguay Round, export credits were
declared to be a form of export subsidy, but it did
not prove possible to agree on constraints.  Countries
belonging to the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development have negotiated a code
for non-agricultural export credits, which puts limits
on credit terms and the length of credit extension,
but it has not been possible to include agriculture in
this agreement. This leaves this topic as one to be
18Pakistan argues for the immediate elimination of “all kinds of export
subsidies by the developed countries.”
19The EU paper does not stake out a position on export subsidies, but
merely notes that they will be on the agenda. The Commission, as
“manager” of internal EU markets, would prefer not to have to use
export subsidies, of course. But until internal prices are reduced to a
level much closer to world prices, surplus products will need to be
removed from the domestic market. Supply control is in place for
sugar, cereals, and dairy production, but is not popular. One intriguing
question is:  What can other countries offer to the European Union in
exchange for an agreement to eliminate export subsidies?58 JULY/AUGUST 2000
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dealt with in the next round, though some countries
have indicated that they do not wish to “pay twice”
for getting rid of such policies.20 It should be possible
to agree on the allowable terms for such credit, and
hence be able to calculate the magnitude of the sub-
sidy that is involved if softer credit terms are offered.
The best way to deal with the subsidy equivalent of
such concessionary credit is to charge it against the
export subsidy constraints in the schedules.
Domestic Support
It is one of the ironies of the Uruguay Round
that, although the biggest conceptual breakthrough
was the acceptance by countries that domestic
policies were a legitimate concern of trade talks,
the actual disciplines imposed on those policies
through the reduction of the Aggregate Measure of
Support (AMS) were rather weak. The key question
for the next round, therefore, is whether to strengthen
or abandon the attempt to constrain domestic poli-
cies. The fact that the AMS constraints have not been
binding for the large majority of countries does not
mean that the constraints on domestic support
have been ineffective. The process of re-instrumen-
tation of domestic support programs, away from
those that most impede trade, has begun. The insti-
tution of the green box has in itself been useful in
deﬁning this objective. The attraction to countries
of adopting green-box policies is both to guard
against challenge from trading partners and to avoid
being counted toward the AMS. Thus, the AMS con-
straint is of value even if not particularly onerous.
The slow but fundamental changes that are
taking place in the agricultural policies of the major
industrial countries need the encouragement and
underpinning of international agreements. The
changes in these policies have generally been in the
direction of improving the climate for agricultural
trade, in contrast to the policy changes in the
1960s and 1970s which led to more trade conﬂicts.
The Uruguay Round was able to take advantage of
these changes, such as the 1992 Reform of the EU’s
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and to get ﬁrm
commitments on future policy directions and sup-
port levels. But this process of reform is still at an
early stage and needs to continue in order to avoid
a swing back toward the costly and ineffective poli-
cies of earlier times.
Some WTO members put weight on the reduc-
tion in domestic support through the AMS. The
United States has called for an “ambitious target” to
be set for the reduction of support. The Cairns Group
points out that the “overall levels of support for
agriculture remain far in excess of subsidies avail-
able to other industries.” But, as with the United
States, their target is clearly the trade-distorting
(amber box) policies. Canada, however, indicates
that it will seek “an overall limit on the amount
of domestic support of all types (green, blue, and
amber).” This could prove difﬁcult. The European
Union has announced that one of its objectives is
to defend the blue box (in essence the compensa-
tion payments under the MacSharry and Agenda
2000 reforms) so as to avoid challenge to these
policies and their scheduled reduction.21 It missed
the chance of changing the nature of these pay-
ments to make them compatible with the green
box criteria, though this could come at some stage
in the negotiations.
The AMS constraints are acknowledged to be
the least effective of the Uruguay Round bindings.
But this does not mean either that they will not be
useful in the future or that a continued reduction
would not be appropriate. A continuation from the
same base would be a relatively modest move, and
yet even that will eventually result in 40 percent
of the “coupled” domestic support having been re-
moved or converted into less trade-distorting types
of programs. But it would be even more effective to
“catch up” with the reductions in import barriers
and export subsidies. Thus one could envisage an
agreed reduction of, say, 52 percent in the expendi-
ture on price-related policies.
The “blue box” containing the U.S. and EU direct
payments that were granted exemption from chal-
lenges under the Blair House Agreement was a
creature of its time, necessary to get agreement to go
ahead with the broader Uruguay Round package. It
is, however, still a somewhat awkward bilateral deal
not appreciated in other parts of the world. Such
an anomaly could possibly be removed in the next
round. The policies of the United States and the
European Union themselves are changing for internal
reasons. The U.S. Federal Agriculture Improvement
20See the paper by Uruguay (WT/GC/W/154). The URAA mandated
negotiations to discipline export credits and guarantees. But whether
this means that their regulation can be considered part of the UR
package or not is doubtful. In practice, the outcome of such negotia-
tions will be rolled into the agreements that come from the new
round, particularly if linked to the removal of export subsidies and
constraints on exporting by state trading enterprises.
21As in the case of export subsidies, EU authorities would not be averse
to reducing direct payments over time. However, they have not yet
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and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 goes further than
ever before to make the payments to farmers
decoupled from output and, therefore, compatible
with the green box. The European Union has con-
sidered a similar move as a part of the continued
reform started in 1992, as a way of making the CAP
consistent with enlargement, but for now the idea
has been shelved.22 The task for the new round will
be made much easier if the European Union and
United States have both modiﬁed their payments
such that they meet the conditions laid down in
the green box. The blue box could then be emptied
and locked.
The green box presently contains a number of
policy instruments that, while probably less trade
distorting than price or income supports, still encour-
age an expansion of output. Sometimes they are
related to otherwise reasonable programs such as
crop insurance, but incidentally increase the incen-
tive to produce by reducing risk. Other programs
may be indirectly linked with production even
though the main reason for payment is not output.
This might be true of certain environmental pay-
ments, which could lead to an increase in output.
But exporters fear that to re-open the deﬁnition of
the green box might, however, allow countries to
argue that it be expanded to include food security
policies and non-decoupled support schemes de-
signed to keep farming in certain areas.
This issue of the size of the green box appears
to be where much of the pre-negotiation rhetoric is
targeted. The argument is usually shrouded in terms
of the “multifunctionality” of agriculture. The con-
cept of multifunctionality is not in itself particularly
novel, as agriculture has always played a complex
role in rural societies, and rural areas have a vital
place in national social and political life. But the
European Union has latched onto the concept as a
way of both providing cover in the WTO for policies
that it would like to maintain and also providing a
rationale for paying farmers in ways that are not
tied to commodity output. Exporters are trying to
neutralize any impact that the idea might have by
pointing out that multifunctionality is neither
restricted to Europe (though the EU Commission
tends to link it to a European farming model, by
implication different from the system of farming
in competitor countries) nor indeed to agriculture.
Importers are trying to link it to the “non-trade con-
cerns” which are mentioned in Article 20 of the
URAA as requiring consideration in planning the
reform of the trade system.
The basic question remains:  What does multi-
functionality mean for trade policy? On the one
hand, it could merely be a recognition that a variety
of programs will be maintained in most societies
which target speciﬁc aspects of rural life. For the
trade system to be seen to rule out such programs
would seem to be as risky as seeming to go against
concerns of human health and animal welfare. On
the other hand, if trade-restricting policies were to
become the accepted instrument for maintaining
multifunctionality, then that could signal a regres-
sion to the time of expensive commodity market
distortions. The green box was intended precisely
to deal with such rural concerns. It would be better
to conﬁrm the criteria for the green box and encour-
age multifunctional policies to conform rather than
opening the green box up to be a repository for an
assortment of production related payments.
One change in the constraints on domestic
support that will probably be discussed is to make
the AMS speciﬁc to individual commodities. This
was the original intention in the Uruguay Round: 
It was at the Blair House negotiations between the
United States and the European Union that the
notion of aggregating the AMS over all commodities
was introduced—essentially to weaken its impact.
The AMS could thus be made more binding at a
stroke by deﬁning commodity speciﬁc amounts of
“coupled” price support expenditures that could
then be reduced over time.
THE EXPANDED CORE AGENDA
The core agenda is likely to be expanded by
reﬁnements and additions to the URAA. Three
areas appear to be on the list for inclusion in this
expanded agenda. These are issues that have been
the concern of the Committee for Agriculture and
the subject of papers in the Analysis and Informa-
tion Exchange process. They include the way in
which the TRQs in agriculture are administered,
the activities of state trading enterprises (STEs), and
the rules regarding export taxes and restrictions.
Each of these items is closely related to the core,
but each will probably require additional rules as
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w ell as the continuation of cuts and the adjustment
of schedules. But in each case the item is a part of
a broader question that could be inﬂuenced by
whether the agricultural talks are “stand alone”
negotiations or a part of a larger package.
Administering TRQs
As a number of countries recognize in their
position papers, the issue of developing a more uni-
form system for the administration of the TRQs is
one of the most urgent tasks for the new agricul-
tural round. TRQs for agricultural imports have
created a new wave of governmental interference
with trade through licensing procedures and pro-
vided a playground for rent-seeking traders—who
will, in turn, have an incentive to lobby for the con-
tinuation of the high above-quota tariffs. The ques-
tion is how to prevent the TRQs from interfering
any more than necessary with the competitive
development of trade.
One answer to the question lies in the method
of allocation. In some cases allocation is done on a
government to government basis, usually in accor-
dance with historical market shares. But this perpet-
uates distortions in trade. To allocate the TRQs to
the exporting country government, as is done for
instance in the case of U.S. sugar imports, implies a
deliberate attempt to inﬂuence the pattern of trade
in favor of the recipient countries.23 This has been
done in the past to target development aid or reward
political friendship.24 Such non-market allocation
schemes may have had their purpose. They do not,
however, promote the competitive trade system
that is the fundamental goal of the WTO. Efﬁcient
producers can make no headway against the assured
market shares of the quota holders. Even allocating
TRQs by country based on historical market shares
does not ensure that the sourcing of supplies for
the importer bears any necessary relation to the
competitiveness of the supplier.
The simple solution to the efﬁciency problem
is to allow quotas to be auctioned, as has been sug-
gested in some academic circles.25 This would
seem an economically sensible solution to the prob-
lem of the capture of rents and to counteract the
incentives to keep the system in place. But this is
also a reason why exporters in particular are likely
to resist such a move. If the TRQs were auctioned
to the exporter the impact would be much like a
tariff. The exporter would bid up to the height of
the tariff concession for the right to sell in the 
import market. The capture by the government of
the rent through the auction process in effect turns
the TRQ into a quasi-tariff, with the height discov-
ered through the auction process. Where the TRQs
replace previous access agreements in which the
quota was allocated to the exporter, the result of
the auction would be to reduce the return from
selling into this market. Thus, there could be con-
siderable resistance to the auctioning of TRQs.
The type of allocation mechanism that causes
most problems, however, is that which gives the import
rights to domestic concerns. Exporters feel they are
neither getting assured access (as the agency or
firm concerned can choose not to import the product,
leading to underﬁll of quotas) or they are not gaining
the beneﬁt of the access (in essence not receiving
any of the quota rent). In instances when the TRQs
have a deliberate purpose, such as the EU arrange-
ments with the African, Caribbean, and Paciﬁc countries
(ACP) and those of the Mediterranean Basin, capture
of rents by the importing ﬁrms negates much of the
beneﬁt of the scheme. When competing domestic
producers receive the import entitlements (as has
happened in a few cases) then the market access
inherent in the TRQs may be elusive.
Any allocation mechanism is subject to criticism.
Using historical shares locks in trade, auctions tax
the exporter for what is supposed to be market access,
and allocation to import agencies encourages rent-
seeking. The best solution in the end may be to steadily
23The U.S. sugar import regime, involving the establishment of TRQs for
traditional suppliers, was introduced in 1982, and thus predates the
Uruguay Round. However, the quotas are now included in the WTO
Schedule for the United States as part of its commitments made in the
Uruguay Round. An argument might be made that the quota allocations
were in any case likely to be distorting trade, as they took no account
of changes in costs among suppliers. They were also of dubious con-
sistency with GATT Article XIII, which endorses the use of market
shares for the initial allocation of quotas but argues that they should be
revised when changed circumstances render that allocation distorting.
24Other examples that have caused trade friction include the EU alloca-
tion of TRQs for bananas, contributing to the WTO trade dispute, and
the U.S. allocation of quotas for dairy products—to the beneﬁt of the
New Zealand Dairy Board. The recent WTO panel report in favor of
Ecuador’s claim that it should have received a larger share of the EU
banana market has conﬁrmed the interpretation of Article XIII that quotas
should change to reﬂect cost and competitiveness among suppliers.
The U.S. dairy quota allocation raised awareness in the United States
of the signiﬁcance of STEs other than the Canadian Wheat Board.
25Tangermann explores the arguments in favor of auctioning the TRQs
(Tangermann, 1997). The issue of auctioning quotas was addressed
some years ago by Bergsten and colleagues in the context of U.S.
import policy. It is an interesting comment on the lack of economic
rationality in trade policy—and the attraction of rents to trading inter-
ests—that such a simple device as auctioning quotas has not so far
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increase the TRQs, as suggested above, or to reduce
the rents by cutting above-quota tariffs, until the
issue of how to allocate them is rendered moot.
State Trading Enterprises
There are three separable issues surrounding
state trading.26 One is the question of whether
state trading importers can reduce market access
below the levels agreed in the schedules. The sec-
ond question is whether exporter state traders can
use “hidden” export subsidies to increase market
share.  The third issue is, in contrast to the suspicion
of export subsidies, a fear that exporters with exclu-
sive or special privileges can exploit consumers by
using their monopoly power. The ﬁrst two of these
are largely agricultural issues, and will probably be
subsumed in the agricultural talks. The third issue
is more general, and should rightly be dealt with in
the broader discussions on competition policy, a
topic of a subsequent section in this paper.
The issue of state trading enterprises that have
special or exclusive rights in import markets can be
thought of as an extension of the problem of market
access. Under WTO articles, state trading importers
are not supposed to grant more protection than that
given by the bound tariff (Article II:4, GATT 47).
Countries could, however, go further than just ensuring
that state trading importers do not give more protec-
tion than the bound tariff.  It would be possible for
instance to link the administration of the TRQs with
the import operations of state traders, perhaps con-
verting the TRQ into an obligation to import rather
than an opportunity. This could reduce the suspicion
that STEs might be responsible for the underﬁll of
the quotas. At the other extreme, one could mandate
that all (or a share) of the TRQ be marketed through
private channels, thus providing some competition
for the STE and allowing price and markup compar-
isons to be made.
The quantiﬁcation of export subsidies and their
reduction has left more visible the distinction between
those countries where exports are privately sold from
those where a parastatal controls such exports. There
is widespread concern in those countries where trade
is by private ﬁrms that the state trading enterprises
can obtain cheap credit from their governments,
offer better terms to buyers, and generally compete
unfairly with the private trade. To the extent that these
practices could be labeled as export subsidies, the issue
is one of monitoring and transparency. But some
commonly used devices such as price pooling (giving
the producer an average price over several destinations
or time periods) are also seen as giving the producer
an unfair advantage. It might, therefore, be a matter
for negotiation as to whether any constraints need
be placed upon STEs with regard to their producer
pricing policies.
The question of single-desk selling agencies for
agricultural products is at the heart of this issue. On
this there are some clear conﬂicts between the
exporters. The United States has indicated that it would
like to “strengthen rules … disciplining activities of
state trading enterprises.” The Cairns Group (with
Canada as a member) is tactfully silent on the
issue, but Canada (in its “Initial Position”document)
states unequivocally that it wishes to “maintain
Canada’s ability to choose how to market its products,
including through orderly marketing systems such as
supply management and the Canadian Wheat Board.”
It attempts to head off a confrontation with the United
States by indicating that it will “not engage in sterile
debates over alternative marketing philosophies,”
though it also indicates a willingness to “discuss
any factual concerns” over “alleged trade effects of
orderly marketing systems.” Demonstrating that the
best defense is often a good offense, Canada adds that
it will “seek to ensure that any new disciplines pro-
posed to deal with the perceived market power [of
single-desk sellers] apply equally to all entities,
public or private, with similar market power.” What
holds for the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) must
hold for Cargill as well!27
Different marketing practices among exporters
are inevitable, and not in themselves undesirable.
But international guidance is needed as to which
practices of parastatal export agencies are con-
sistent with agreed conditions of competition and
which distort that competition. Now that the more
clear-cut kinds of export subsidy have been identi-
ﬁed and included in the country schedules of
allowable subsidies, the main task of the negoti-
ations will be to clarify the deﬁnition as regards the
actions of state trading exporters.28 This would
ensure that such actions as dual pricing and price
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pooling, if deemed to be hidden subsidies, could be
counted against the schedule for that country.
Export Restrictions
In the next round, importers are likely to lead a
movement to constrain the ability of exporters to
restrict supplies. After all, restraints on exports are
no less inconsistent with an open trade system than
restraints on imports. Export taxes should be in-
cluded under the same qualiﬁcations as quantitative
restrictions. The argument has already surfaced in
connection with the Food Security Declaration ap-
pended to the Uruguay Round Agreement (the Min-
isterial Decision on Measures Concerning the Pos-
sible Negative Effects of the Reform Program on
Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing
Countries). It seems inconsistent to leave in place
the possibility of export taxes and quantitative
restrictions that have an immediate and harmful
impact on developing country food importers.
The practice of export taxes and export restraints
through quantitative controls can conveniently be
thought of as an extension of the issue of export
competition. Within the GATT, export controls are
generally disallowed, though export taxes are deemed
innocuous. Article XI of GATT 1947 prohibits quan-
titative export restrictions, but makes an explicit ex-
ception for “export prohibitions or restrictions tem-
porarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages
of foodstuffs or other products essential to the ex-
porting contracting party.” There is a clear conﬂict
between the ability of exporters to withhold supplies
to relieve domestic shortages and the reliability of
the world market as a source of supplies for importers.
The inclusion of stronger disciplines on export taxes
and embargoes is likely to be part of the next round
of agricultural talks.
Several countries have indicated their views on
this matter. Canada indicates that it will seek a ban
on “the inclusion of food and feedstuffs in national
security embargoes” together with a ban on “export
restrictions that would reduce the proportion of the
total supply of an agricultural product permitted to
be exported compared to the proportion prevailing
in a previous representative period.” Japan also argues
for strengthening the disciplines concerning export
taxes and export restrictions in part to “redress the
balance of rights and obligations between exporting
and importing countries.” Developing countries have
so far focused on other aspects of food security, such
as putting “teeth” into the Ministerial Decision. The
EU paper does not mention export restrictions and
taxes:  It was the introduction of export levies in
1995 and 1996 to keep cereal prices from rising on
the internal EU market that has reawakened
interest in the issue of export restrictions.
PARALLEL ISSUES FOR THE 
NEGOTIATIONS
As if the core agenda and its extensions were
not enough, negotiators will be faced with a set of
“parallel” issues that could determine both the tone
and even the content of the agricultural talks. These
include the safety and environmental issues as well
as those of trade preferences and regionalism. Agri-
culture is intimately involved in each area, though
the main discussions will be outside the agricul-
tural talks.
Health, Safety, and Environmental Issues
Among the most controversial issues that will
confront negotiators is that of disparate health,
safety, and environmental standards. Some of these
issues have been around for a long time. Others are
new and pose a challenge for the trade system as a
result of their novelty. Some reﬂect increasing sen-
sitivity of consumer and environmental groups to
food-related issues. Others arise because ﬁrms ﬁnd
the different costs of compliance to have an impact
on competitiveness.
Conﬂicts arising from different sanitary and
phytosanitary (SPS) standards have posed problems
for the GATT for many years. Under the GATT 1947,
sanitary and phytosanitary measures which impinged
on trade were covered by Article XX(b), which allows
countries to employ trade barriers “necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health” that
would otherwise be illegal—so long as “such measures
are not applied in a manner that would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustiﬁable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or as a disguised restriction on international trade”
(Josling, Tangermann, and Warley, 1996). But Article
XX had no teeth:  There was no deﬁnition of the
criteria by which to judge “necessity,” and there was
no speciﬁc procedure for settling disputes on such
matters. The attempt in the Tokyo Round to improve
on this situation through the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (1979), known as the Standards
Code, also failed. Though a dispute settlement
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encouraged to adopt international standards, rela-
tively few countries signed the Code, and a number
of basic issues were still unresolved.
Intensive negotiations in the Uruguay Round
led eventually to a new SPS Agreement that tried to
repair the faults of the existing code. This Agreement
deﬁned new criteria that had to be met when imposing
regulations on imports more onerous than those
agreed upon in international standards. These in-
cluded scientiﬁc evidence that the measure was
needed; assessment of the risks involved; and recog-
nition of the equivalence of different ways of testing
and sampling. In addition, the dispute settlement
mechanism was considerably strengthened under
the WTO to make it easier to obtain an outcome
that could not be avoided by the losing party.29 The
force of the SPS Agreement comes in part from the
more precise conditions under which standards
stricter than international norms can be justiﬁed
and partly from the strengthened dispute settlement
process within the WTO. In this regard, much was
expected of the panel report in the beef-hormone
dispute between the European Union on the one
hand and Canada and the United States on the
other. This was widely seen as a test case for the
new SPS Agreement.30
The SPS Agreement was reviewed earlier this
year by the SPS Committee, which found no reason
to suggest modiﬁcations. The United States and the
Cairns Group are not likely to wish to tamper with
a hard-won agreement that has “science” at its core.
The European Union, however, has let it be known
that a few amendments would not be out of place.
The desire to build in the reaction to consumer con-
ﬁdence is natural:  Presumably it could be argued
that the beef-hormone case would be rendered moot
by a well-crafted clause written into a revised SPS
Agreement. The question as to whether the trade
system can tolerate regulations that take into account
subjective or irrational consumer demand shifts is
one of the most contentious issues in trade policy
between the United States and the European Union.
One particularly contentious issue that is directly
relevant to the global agri-food system is the extent
to which the use of genetically modiﬁed organisms
(GMOs) is harmful to the environment or indeed to
consumer health.31 Concerns with transgenic crops,
such as those with herbicide resistance built into
their genetic make-up, have centered around the
possibility of unpredictable crosses with wild species
and, hence, the development of herbicide resistant
weeds. Those with genetically-manipulated insect
resistance give rise to concerns about the develop-
ment of resistant insects and about collateral damage
to harmless or beneﬁcial insects. Clearly there needs
to be vigilance to avoid the undesirable side effects
of otherwise useful technology. Other fears are that
consumers who suffer from plant-related allergies
may react to the presence of genes from those plants
to which they are allergic. The most commonly
recommended remedy for preventing such problems
is adequate labeling, but even this creates problems
for public policy.
That the GMO issue will come up in the trade
talks is inevitable. How it can be resolved, or at
least channeled in a way that does not impede
other areas of the talks is less certain. The United
States has suggested that “additional approaches
that address market access issues for biotechnol-
ogy products” be pursued. Canada has suggested
a Working Party to look at all aspects of the GMO
issue, presumably including labeling and import
restrictions, as a way of dealing with the issue
directly. The European Union has positioned itself
to take the view that existing agreements (such 
as the SPS and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
Agreements) may need to be revised in the light 
of the challenge of GMOs. The exporters have 
been trying to coordinate their positions through
the Cairns Group and through bilateral talks. 
The Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC)
ministers have also been discussing the development
of a coordinated plan for the regulation of trade 
in GMOs. The apparent aim at the moment is to
isolate the European Union on this issue rather 
to engage it in a trade forum.
Creeping up behind GMOs as the next contro-
versial issue is that of animal welfare. Few topics
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29The Decision on the Application and Review of the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the
Dispute Settlement Understanding) provides a framework for the bet-
ter enforcement of panel rulings. To block the adoption of a Report
from a Panel now requires consensus. Any party may appeal the rul-
ing (on issues of law), but the Appellate Body Report is ﬁnal.
30On July 31, 1981, the EC Council of Ministers adopted a Directive
banning hormones in livestock production (81/602/EEC).  This led,
after a tortuous legislative journey, to the enactment of regulations on
December 31, 1985, which banned the use of all of the hormones for
growth promotion purposes and established regulations for the use of
these hormones for therapeutic purposes.  This Directive was challenged
in the European Court of Justice, and was annulled by the Court on
procedural grounds.  Finally, the Directives were reintroduced by the
EC Commission and readopted by the EC Council as Council Directive
88/146/EEC on March 16, 1988.
31For a full discussion of this topic, see Nelson, et al. (1999). The trade
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engender public outrage, at least in Northern
Europe, and pose more serious problems for inter-
national regulation. Farmers in Europe are already
having to modify their farming practices to meet
new animal welfare standards. They are naturally
arguing that it would be “unfair” to leave them to
compete with producers who do not have to meet
the same standards. The issue will revolve around
whether some degree of protection at the border is
allowable to compensate for the extra costs, whether
border controls can keep out goods produced under
conditions considered unsuitable by the importing
country, and whether direct assistance can be
given to domestic farmers who are burdened by
such regulations without such assistance being
considered “yellow-box” support. In this respect,
the animal welfare debate may become part of the
discussion on environmental programs, where the
same choices apply. But the animal welfare issue
could also take on some of the aspects of the GMO
controversy, if genetically modiﬁed animal products
start to be marketed.
The Trade Preference Issue
Trade preferences have a long history in agri-
culture. Countries in Europe (particularly France,
the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands) have
kept close commercial ties with their former col-
onies based on preferential access to their markets.
These ties were assumed by the European Union
under successive Lomé Conventions, the current
one of which expired in March 1999.  The European
Union suggested signiﬁcant changes in the agree-
ment, in part to try to avoid the perpetuation of a
dependency relationship based on the export of a
small number of commodities with limited market
prospects. The Lomé Convention is in any case likely
to change markedly in the coming years:  It has been
declared to be in contravention of international
trade rules.32 The European Union was granted a
waiver until the year 2000 from the obligation to
bring the Lomé Convention into conformity with the
WTO rules. If such a waiver is still required after
that year, it will have to be renewed annually.33
Developing countries face a dilemma in the
area of trade preferences. On the one hand, many
developing countries beneﬁt from them. On the
other hand, most of them grant preferences at the
expense of other developing countries. Exporters
under the schemes gain valuable access and higher
prices, but get locked into particular markets and
products. Those exporters that have not had exten-
sive preferences have in many cases outperformed
those that have had such access. Moreover, prefer-
ences that are given unilaterally by the importer 
do not have the same guarantees as trade access
under the WTO. Investors may remain wary of 
the future of some of the commodity preference
schemes.
Illustrative of the preference issue is the con-
ﬂict over trade in bananas. A WTO panel found that
several of the mechanisms used to allocate banana
imports under the EU’s regime of quantitative restric-
tions violated international trade rules. The dispute
has put banana-exporting countries at odds with
each other and led to the (mistaken) view that the
WTO is being used to undermine the economies of
the smaller islands that are heavily dependent on
the crop for export earnings. The banana issue is
the most contentious trade policy issue for the
Caribbean and Central American regions.
The European Union has promised a new set
of regulations that should prove to be more WTO-
consistent. The urgency is that an unresolved
banana issue will be a problem for the European
Union as it enters into negotiations with its WTO
partners. The European Union will, if the beef-hor-
mone dispute is not rapidly settled, be saddled
with the burden of two adverse rulings by panels
with which it has not yet complied. But the solution
of the banana problem itself could eventually be
settled in the negotiations, just as the long-running
oilseed dispute was settled in a package (at Blair
House) along with the ﬁnal agreement on agricul-
ture in the Uruguay Round.
32The ﬁrst banana panel raised the issue of the legality of the Convention
under the GATT. The Convention could hardly be justiﬁed as a part of
a Free Trade Area, under Article XXIV of the GATT, as it was non-recip-
rocal. ACP countries did not have to grant duty-free access to the prod-
ucts of Europe. Preferences are also allowed under the so-called “enabling
clause” for giving advantages to developing countries. But the justiﬁ-
cation of the Lomé Convention as a manifestation of “special and dif-
ferential treatment” in favor of developing countries, encouraged by
the GATT, was rendered doubtful by the fact that many developing
countries (in Asia, mostly) did not qualify for ACP assistance and 
trade beneﬁts.
33The European Union is not the only body to grant trade preferences.
The United States runs regional preferences for Central America and
the Caribbean under the Caribbean Basin Initiative and other schemes.
Though these cover more products than the EU protocols, they are
also not WTO-compatible Free Trade Areas nor non-discriminatory
development assistance. They also have required a WTO waiver, 
and will eventually become reciprocal free-trade schemes.JULY/AUGUST 2000       65
The Challenge of Regionalism
The most signiﬁcant challenge to the WTO
comes from the success of a parallel means of trade
liberalization—that within regional trade pacts. The
recent growth of regionalism, unlike many of the
earlier regional trade pacts, has signiﬁcant implica-
tions for agriculture. Many regional trade agreements
have in the past left agriculture out of the free-trade
provisions, in deference to the political sensitivity
of the sector and the potential conﬂict with domestic
policy objectives. The situation is rapidly changing.
Numerous regional trade pacts—the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the common market
among Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil
(MERCOSUR), the Andean Pact, the Caribbean
Community and Common Market (CARICOM), and
the Closer Economic Relations (CER) Agreement
between Australia and New Zealand—all include
agriculture in their free-trade provisions. The coun-
tries of Central Europe have included agriculture fully
in the Baltic Free Trade Area (BFTA) and in a more
limited way in the Central European Free Trade Area
(CEFTA). The Europe Agreements that aim for free
trade between the Central and Eastern European
countries and the European Union also include
agriculture, albeit with some temporary quantitative
limits. In Asia the process has gone less far:  The
countries of the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) have been unwilling to incorporate
agriculture as an integral part of their free trade area
(AFTA), though some commodities are included. To
the extent that these agreements do include agricul-
ture, this gives them a new significance in the process
of liberalizing agricultural trade and necessitates
some coordination with the multilateral process.
The fact that the new brand of regional trade
agreement includes agricultural trade within the bloc
is clearly a mixed blessing. It carries with it the danger
that high-cost production will be sheltered and
supported in these trade blocs, as Europe’s regime
of free trade within the European Union has done.
But this arose because of the high level of support
and protection at the border. Today’s new regional
blocs seem to have learned the lesson. In other
blocs, trade creation seems to have been the domi-
nant effect, helped in large part by the domestic
policy reforms that have gone hand-in-hand with
the regional trade pacts. Freer regional trade in agri-
cultural products seems, therefore, in most cases to
be consistent with, and hence a step towards, global
trade liberalization. The only major qualiﬁcation is
that each member of a regional trade agreement
should reduce tariffs on third-country agricultural
trade so as not to increase regional preferences and
hence generate trade diversion. This could either
be done jointly through agreement with other
members on external protection, in the case of a
customs union, or independently through unilateral
liberalization, in the case of a free trade area. Multi-
lateral negotiations become the best way to keep
down the level of protection against non-partner
imports so as to avoid trade diversion. If both
internal and external protection are progressively
removed, the regional and the multilateral paths in
effect go hand-in-hand toward the same goal.
The potential conﬂicts between regional and
multilateral trade agreements urgently need to be
resolved. In the case of agriculture, the next WTO
round should integrate global and regional liberali-
zation processes. This could be done by establish-
ing targets for multilateral agricultural trade liber-
alization that are consistent with those already
announced within the regional and supra-regional
groups. Negotiations could even be facilitated by
the adoption of collective positions by regional
blocs.  The multilateral talks could incorporate
supra-regional negotiations as ways of achieving
the global targets and focus on the relationship
among such groups and between those groups
and outside countries.
Three possible ways could be explored to
strengthen the complementarity between regional
and global trade rules. Each of these steps supports
the multilateral system without provoking a direct
clash with the forces that are working for regional
trade integration.34 First, the existing WTO rules
on the acceptability of free-trade areas and customs
unions could be applied more rigorously.  The
requirement that “substantially all trade” be covered
should be clariﬁed. Omitting a major sector of the
economy such as agriculture should not be possible,
and even omitting a handful of sensitive commodi-
ties should only be allowed if the existing (and
potential) trade in those products is negligible.
Moreover, the rule could be further strengthened
by agreeing that the exemption is of a temporary
nature, and that in time all trade would be covered.
Second, as a condition of the free-trade area or
customs union being accepted by other WTO mem-
bers, the countries participating should be required
to ensure that other countries are not adversely
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affected. This should be done primarily through
reductions in the tariff levels against third countries.
Presently, countries can ask for compensation if
tariffs go up, but the most common cause of trade
diversion arises from a switch in suppliers that can
take place even if no tariffs increase. It would be
useful to require reduction in applied tariffs when
regional trade blocs are set up or expanded.
The third step that could usefully be taken at
the multilateral level is to ask the Committee on
Agriculture, in conjunction with the committee that
oversees free trade areas and customs unions, to
report on the activities of these blocs in light of the
multilateral trade reform process.  Such reporting
could include monitoring of trade ﬂows and prefer-
ence levels, as well as policy changes that have
signiﬁcance for the multilateral system. Circumstances
where a conﬂict between regional and global liber-
alization and trade reform is likely could be identi-
ﬁed and discussed. Trade blocs would in this way 
be obliged to defend their actions in the light of 
the application of global rules and objectives. Other
countries would have an opportunity to question
such developments rather than relying exclusively
on the dispute settlement process to challenge cases
of conﬂicts. Such additional ongoing scrutiny would
greatly improve understanding about the magnitude
of the conﬂict between regional and multilateral
trade processes and rules in agriculture.
RELATED ISSUES
Even further removed from the realm of agri-
cultural trade negotiations, but in many ways as
relevant for the sector, are three additional issues
that might become a part of the next round. One is
the regulations surrounding intellectual property.
As a result of the spread of biotechnology, agricul-
ture now has a stake in this regulatory process.
Foreign investment is also increasingly important
to the agricultural sector, and that again could be
on the agenda for the round.  Finally, the large and
complex issue of competition, already mentioned
above in connection with the activities of state
trading enterprises, could be a subject for at least
initial discussion.
Intellectual Property Issues in Agriculture
Among the newer aspects of international trade
policy is the setting up of rules regarding intellec-
tual property. The emergence of international rules
predates the GATT Uruguay Round, with the estab-
lishment of the World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation (WIPO), but there was insufﬁcient incentive
for countries without intellectual property protection
to join. But the breakthrough came in the Uruguay
Round when the negotiating countries signed the
Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agree-
ment. TRIPS brought a degree of harmonization to
the disparate treatment of patents, copyrights, and
trademarks in various trading countries.
One important area of the food and agricultural
sector where the rules on intellectual property are
signiﬁcant is in the input industries. The seed
sector, in particular, has already made use of such
international values to try to reclaim some revenue
from farmers. The ability to patent plant varieties
has been a controversial topic for some years. Now
one has the possibility to patent particular manipu-
lations of genetic material such as is at the root of
biotechnology. This would give a much greater
chance for companies to license new varieties to
others to plant.35 This is of concern among some
who fear that the highly concentrated seed industry
could extract considerable proﬁts from farmers
worldwide, as they would have to pay from season
to season for planting even their own retained seed.
A second linkage between agriculture and
intellectual property is in the area of geographical
trademarks and appellations. It is widely held that
such geographical labels help the consumer to pick
a brand on which they can rely. It is also possible
that the same useful information can have the
effect of inhibiting competition and earning scar-
city rents for the holder of the patent. But, regard-
less of the merits of particular systems of labeling,
some form of brand identiﬁcation is an important
part of the trade system in foods as in other areas.
The European Union is particularly keen to see an
extension of the protection for geographical appel-
lations (it does not wish to consider them as mere
trademarks) as a reﬂection of the commercially
important name recognition of many European
food specialties. In any package of measures, some
further protection of this type could have a useful
role as an issue that the European Union can sell 
to its domestic constituents.
35Though plant breeders’ rights have been recognized since the 1930s
in the United States, it has proved impossible to patent improvements
that come through selection in the ﬁeld (landrace crosses) and not easy
to see the justiﬁcation for doing so. But when the improvement comes
in the laboratory, as a result of using particular genetic material in a
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Foreign Investment and Agriculture
The global system, whether in agri-food prod-
ucts or in automobiles or computers, depends on
foreign investment. But global investment also re-
quires rules, and these are not yet fully developed.
Several issues are at stake in the area of investment:
Assurance of the host country authorities that the
assets owned by foreigners will not be expropriated,
that earnings from investments can be taken out of
the country, and that there will not be undue restric-
tions (such as requirements to use domestic inputs
or to export a share of outputs) on the foreign oper-
ation. Firms have alternatives, and countries that
maintain policies that are not investment-friendly
may lose the opportunity to participate in the global
division of labor. The global reach of food retailing
and processing similarly requires the assurance that
facilities abroad will not be expropriated and that
undue restrictions are not placed on the repatriation
of earnings.
Some start to the forging of a more transparent
investment environment was made in the Uruguay
Round, with the Agreement on Trade Related Invest-
ment Measures. More recently, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries have been trying to work out a Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI). At present the MAI
is moribund, a victim in part of unfavorable reactions
from the non-OECD countries. But the European
Union has promised to raise the issue again for
inclusion in the next round of trade talks. Devel-
oping countries are generally wary of negotiating
on a topic where they consider that they have little
to gain and something (at least in policy ﬂexibility)
to lose. Agricultural issues have not been promi-
nent in the investment rule debate, but the outcome
of these negotiations will clearly have an impact on
the agri-food sector.
Competition Policy
The third and more profound set of related
issues is the need for international rules on compe-
tition policy. It could be argued that a global trade
system needs global competition laws, but this
argument has had little effect so far on trade policy
discussions. Whilst some are calling for full-scale
negotiations on international competition policy,
others maintain that the most one can do is to make
sure that each trading country has its own anti-
trust policy in place. But the minimalist approach
is unlikely to be satisfactory as a long-term solution
by itself. The best policy for curbing misuse of
market power in any one country is an open trade
system. But the very openness of the trade system
allows large ﬁrms to develop market power in the
world market. Global competition policy will even-
tually focus more on market power in world mar-
kets than on enforcing competition policy in each
national market.
The issue of competition is at the heart of the
conﬂict over state trading. Without market power
the state trader can do little.36 If markets are con-
testable, the agency that imports cannot sell for
more on the domestic market than a private trader
who buys at world prices and pays a tariff. An export
STE can only buy products to sell abroad if it pays
the same price that private traders would pay. It
has no incentive to sell below world prices, other
than to remove inventories or to develop markets:
In this respect it acts the same as a private ﬁrm. It
is the ability to block other imports or to act as the
exclusive sales agent for farmers that sets parastatals
apart from other marketing agencies. But it is difﬁ-
cult to see how one can develop effective disciplines
on competition among agricultural enterprises
without tackling the problem across all sectors.
Parastatal agencies in agriculture are, of course,
only one set of institutions that might eventually
fall under the watchful eye of the WTO. Concentra-
tion of economic power is not conﬁned to public
agencies given monopoly rights in importing or
exporting. Private ﬁrms can have signiﬁcant market
power to inﬂuence prices. Should there be any
rules relating to the use of market power in inter-
national markets? What are the dangers that the
rules are trying to prevent? Is the problem the
withholding of supplies to raise the price of com-
modities? This seems relatively unlikely in the case
of basic foods, but could happen with vital supply
components. Or is the problem one of dumping
and market disruption? The incorporation of anti-
dumping rules in a set of more comprehensive
competition regulations is the object of many trade
economists. Whatever is agreed upon will have sig-
niﬁcant implications for global agriculture.
OTHER INFLUENCES ON THE AGENDA
Some of the most important items are not even
on the agenda. One of these is the question of
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China’s membership, which was still under negoti-
ation at the time of the Seattle Ministerial. A some-
what different issue is the debate that is continuing
in many quarters on the costs and beneﬁts of glob-
alization. The round will act as a focus for those
who are discontented with the process of liberal-
ization and its role in promoting global markets.
Trade ofﬁcials are taking seriously the need to engage
the public in an attempt to convince domestic con-
stituencies of the value of continuing the process.
Agriculture and food issues promise to have a
prominent place in this debate. Finally, the exoge-
nous forces of weather, crop failure, and other
market perturbations will also play a role, though
in what way is not entirely clear.
Expanding Membership of the WTO
The application of China for re-entry into the
WTO (it withdrew from GATT membership in 1950)
poses very signiﬁcant problems and enormous possi-
bilities for agricultural trade, as for many other aspects
of the international trade system. The opportunities
are the result of the huge market potential and the
strong economic growth. China could undoubtedly
become a major player in agricultural markets:  The
issue is under what conditions and rules will such
trade take place? Besides issues of market access,
Chinese accession raises fundamental systemic
questions such as the behavior of the state trading
entities in China and indeed the extent to which
the government controls, albeit indirectly, all trade
decisions in that country. As a major player in agri-
cultural trade markets, the terms under which
China should be allowed into the WTO will have 
a signiﬁcant impact on the rules that can be set 
for other countries with parastatal agencies 
active in the market.
The conclusion in 1999 of bilateral talks be-
tween China and the United States has given new
hope that accession will soon be a reality. Elements
within the Chinese government that are favorably
inclined to the continued opening up of the econ-
omy have apparently prevailed, and presented a
package that offered major concessions to the
demands of the United States. Following talks with
the European Union, this agreement could provide
the basis for membership by some time in the year
2000. The generally liberal thrust of the Chinese
offer could be of signiﬁcance in the agricultural
talks. China is reported to have agreed not to use
export subsidies. Domestic support levels are also
to be bound at low levels. Tariffs of a modest level
will leave that country far more open than any of
the other Asian importing nations, and almost as
low as the most liberal members of the Cairns
Group. This could have an impact on the talks. The
prospect of a large open market in China is likely
to encourage other countries to gear their agricul-
tural policy toward exports.
Russia has also requested to join the WTO,
along with the Ukraine and several other parts of
the former Soviet Union. The problems that will
emerge when these negotiations get under way will
have some of the same features as the talks with
China. Other countries will be concerned with the
role of the state and the extent to which exports
can be subsidized or imports restricted by non-
transparent state action. However, some of these
countries have made major political reforms that
make them “open” and less likely to cause funda-
mental conﬂict with WTO rules. For these, one
might anticipate somewhat more speedy negoti-
ations than have been the case with China. They
could even enter the WTO within the next year or
two. But this is not true in the case of Russia. Until
such time as that country develops a stable admin-
istrative system capable of implementing WTO
rules and obligations, it may have to be content
with “observer” status.
The Politics of Globalization
The globalization of the food and agricultural
sectors that has taken place over the past two
decades has changed the relationship between
trade policy and the agricultural sector in critical
ways. Among these is the fact that agriculture has
been caught up in the politics of globalization.
Nowhere is that more clearly seen than in the area
of health, safety, and environmental standards. The
political setting in which discussions of the SPS
Agreement will take place, both with respect to the
impact of globalization and with regard to the role
of developing countries, could in part determine
the future of the agreement. The WTO Council will
be under pressure from nongovernmental organi-
zations to address the impact of globalization on
the environment, income distribution, and national
sovereignty. One aspect of this pressure will be
related to food safety. The politics of food safety
has been transformed by a chain of events that has
sensitized public interest groups, particularly in
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system. Starting with problems arising from the
misuse of hormones in animal feed in Europe in
the 1970s, through adulterated wine and vegetable
oil in the 1980s, to the bovine spongiform enceph-
alopathy outbreak (“mad cow” disease) and the
dioxin scare of the 1990s, a series of unfortunate
health problems has convinced consumers and
consumer watchdog groups that the regulatory sys-
tems are not always adequate. In addition, scientiﬁc
bodies have also lost credibility in some countries
in part as a result of evolving knowledge about the
health effects of certain chemicals. Most important,
politicians have become discredited as a source of
assurance. Transferring responsibility to the inter-
national level does not seem to have helped
establish credibility. There is a widespread public
perception that international rules are imposing
lower standards on countries through insistence on
science-based risk assessment.37
What does this mean for international trade
policy? Though there is little evidence that increased
international trade in agricultural goods and food-
stuffs has had any deleterious impact on food safety,
the tendency is always present to make the link
between importing food products from overseas
and more lax health and environmental standards.
As a consequence, food scares often have more than
a proportional impact on trade. Export interests are
unlikely to be sympathetic to the “irrational” views
of foreign consumers, who, exporters believe, should
learn to trust the authorities, even though their own
consumers can be equally unpredictable. Exporting
governments support this rational view, in particular
since they don’t have to face elections in the importing
countries. From the standpoint of the politics of glo-
balization, this plays into the hands of those who
paint multinational companies as insensitive and
mercenary. Thus at the Seattle meeting, where another
act in the drama will be played out, governments
are going to have to show enough concern about
food safety to avoid losing the initiative to those
who will use food scares to convince the public
that global food systems are stacked against the
consumer interest.
World Market Conditions and Trade Talks
One of the intriguing questions about trade lib-
eralization in agriculture is the relationship
between trade talks and world market conditions.
On the one hand, it was clear from the experience
of the mid-1980s that a period of low commodity
prices concentrated the attention of agricultural
politicians and brought the ﬁnancial departments
of governments to the view that they had to reform
farm policies. The export subsidy war was becoming
too expensive. But the pressure was off by 1990, as
prices recovered. Reform succeeded in the mid-1990s
in part because world prices were ﬁrm, and farmers
felt they could live without the safety net of govern-
ment purchases.38 But commodity prices tumbled
again in 1998 and no immediate sign of recovery is
at hand. The United States launched a ﬁnancial rescue
package in 1998 and followed it up with more relief
in 1999. These emergency packages, whether or
not strictly in the “green box” have certainly been
in response to low prices, and thus must have some
effect of keeping up production. It will be less easy
for the United States to argue that its policy is now
fully decoupled from prices and hence is production-
neutral. On the other hand, the low prices have
threatened a further budget crisis in the European
Union, in particular in the face of its imminent
enlargement, and made yet another CAP reform
package likely in the next three years.
The interests of developing countries might
also seem to be tied to world price movements. At
times of high prices, food importers look for reli-
able food supplies both on commercial and con-
cessional terms. In the 1970s, this translated into a
focus on international agreements, food aid, and
storage programs. Trade liberalization was delayed
as countries geared up for shortages. But devel-
oping countries would also seem to be reluctant to
liberalize when world prices are low, as in the mid-
1980s, because domestic producers fear inter-
national competition. Some liberalization is pos-
sible at times of rapid currency devaluation during
a period of adequate world supplies. Conversely, it
may be most difﬁcult to reform policies when world
prices are ﬁrm.  No one knows for sure how world
prices will develop over the course of the next
round, but economic recovery in Asia, together
with any crop shortages, could provide a positive
backdrop for the conclusion of the next set of agri-
cultural negotiations.
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THE TIMING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
There are a few ﬁxed points that give an indica-
tion as to the timing of the agricultural talks. The
URAA itself mandated negotiations on agriculture
to be started before the end of the transition period,
i.e., in 1999. But starting the talks does not mean
that they will move fast or far without further in-
centives or deadlines. It would be useful to get 
the talks off to a fast start, as soon as negotiating
authority is received by the major actors, but there
will always be elections or market developments
that make it a bad time for some country or other
to agree to liberalization. One of the few deadlines
is 2003, when the Peace Clause expires. Thereafter,
unless the Peace Clause is renewed, the general
WTO rules governing subsidies and dumping will
apply to agriculture. This will presumably give a
useful boost to negotiations if they are not com-
plete by that date. The promise to renew the Peace
Clause may also be a useful incentive for countries
such as the European Union to continue reforms.
Adding to the factors that might delay com-
pletion of the Round is the increased number of
countries that will be taking part. Moreover, China
and other aspirants (though not Russia) could also
be members either near the start of negotiations or
before they conclude. This will bring in important
agricultural traders who will have considerable
inﬂuence on world market conditions, but it may
make reaching a solution more difﬁcult.
Any WTO action has to be acceptable to all its
members. In the past the leadership has fallen to the
developed countries, and more particularly the United
States and the European Union. This is rapidly
changing. In particular, developing countries will
play a more important role in the next round. This
is clearly appropriate: They should be full partners
in the continuation of agricultural trade reform. As
major producers and traders of agricultural products,
they need to feel that they are beneﬁciaries of this
reform. But, in addition, these countries must also
participate more actively in the market opening by
bringing down the high ceiling bindings and giving
up the remaining non-tariff trade barriers. This
would also involve assurances by developed coun-
tries to resist policies that cause market disruption
and threats to food security. Preferential schemes
for commodity exports also need to be consolidated
within regular trade agreements and differential
treatment rules revised to encourage full participa-
tion in trade liberalization as soon as possible. The
next round may focus as much on the integration
of developing countries fully into the trade system
as on the more traditional conﬂicts among industrial
countries.
Does this mean that there will be little incentive
to ﬁnish the negotiations once they have started?
The United States in particular is concerned that the
incentives to delay are removed. Hence, the proposal
supported both by the United States and the Euro-
pean Union is for a time limit of three years. This
conveniently coincides with both the expiry of the
Peace Clause and the end of the current U.S. Farm
Bill, as well as the date that the European Union
has set for a review of some of its own measures.
Perhaps the main determinant of the timing
and ambitiousness of the agricultural talks, how-
ever, is the decision as to whether they should be a
part of a large, multi-sector negotiation or whether
they will be self-contained. Most commentators
argue that a negotiation that only included agricul-
ture would be difﬁcult to conclude. Countries that
felt they stood to lose would have no offsetting gains
in other areas. However, no agreement has yet been
reached on the scope for the next round, and so it
is uncertain what “package” will be possible.
POST-SEATTLE POSTSCRIPT
The WTO Ministerial that was intended to launch
a new round of trade negotiations took place in
Seattle amid confusion, both within and outside the
meeting room. The Ministers assembled without an
agreed draft document from their WTO Ambassadors
in Geneva. In many cases, they also lacked the agree-
ment of their governments to compromise to deliver
a new comprehensive round. The time proved too
short to bridge the fundamental gaps that remained
between the various positions, and the difﬁculty of
reaching agreement by consensus among a group of
135 nations was overwhelming. In the end the
meeting ended with no clear decision taken either
on the agenda for a new round or, indeed, on the next
steps toward such a round. The prevailing wisdom is
that it is unlikely that much progress will be made
before the U.S. election at the end of the year 2000.
Outside the meeting rooms the degree of orga-
nization was better, though there was ample confu-
sion both on means and ends among the protesters.
Though the protests themselves played little role in
the failure of the Ministerial, the political fallout
from the intensity of the opposition to the WTO
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for the U.S. Congress to agree to the permanent
granting of most favored nation status to China, a
move that would seem necessary if that country is
to join the WTO. And the legitimacy of the WTO
dispute settlement process could also be undermined
if it was to be directly challenged by national politi-
cians in the name of “democracy.”
The collapse of the Seattle talks, while dis-
appointing, does not imply that the agricultural
negotiations will not go ahead. As a part of the built-
in agenda from the Uruguay Round, negotiations
will begin in Geneva soon. The problem is that
without the impetus that would have been given to
the sectoral talks in agriculture and services, these two
sets of discussions will have to advance through
their own internal logic and political will. In the case
of agriculture, this gives back control over the ambi-
tiousness of the agenda to the reluctant liberalizers,
such as Japan and the European Union.
A clear indication of this impact emerged from
the dust of Seattle. The European Union was on the
brink of agreeing to wording in the agricultural para-
graphs of the declaration that would have excluded
the term “multifunctionality” from the draft, and
would have stated that the objective of the negotia-
tions was to move “in the direction” of removing
export subsidies. But, the European Union made it
clear after the breakdown of the talks that these
concessions would have to be negotiated afresh if
the rest of the package was not agreed. The United
States was suspicious that the European Union was
pushing a broad agenda to avoid the spotlight falling
on agriculture. The European Union, on the other
hand, undoubtedly could have moved more easily
on agriculture if other sectors had been included.
The impact of single sector negotiations not embedded
in a round, therefore, is to put the focus squarely
on agriculture but also to make it more difﬁcult to
get a “good” outcome.
The Peace Clause, as indicated above, is the
“internal” driving force behind further agricultural
trade reform. But the impact of removal of the pro-
tection of the Peace Clause depends crucially on
the effectiveness of the dispute settlement process.
If countries lose their conﬁdence in this aspect of
the WTO, as the demonstrators on the streets of
Seattle have clearly done, then the threat of action
through panels is greatly diminished. This then
could be the ultimate impact of Seattle. The agenda
for further talks may well be curtailed, but progress
could still occur. But the loss of political legitimacy
and support for the WTO as an institution, and in
particular a weakening of the dispute-settlement
mechanism, would be a much more fundamental
blow. How WTO member governments tackle the
problem of mending fences and improving proce-
dures in the next few months could well be crucial
for agricultural as for other trade.
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